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Abstract
We investigate models of two-sided matching markets without transfers. Examples of such markets include marriage market,
universities-applicants market and others. Gale and Shapley in 1962 ﬁrst introduced this kind of problems in the literature. They
considered one-to-one and one-to-many markets, where preferences of individuals on the one side over individuals on the other
side were strict.
In this paper we analyze a modiﬁcation of the classical Gale-Shapley admission problem, where preferences of universities are
considered to be interval orders. Interval order allows a speciﬁc form of indifference in the preference relation. Imagine, each
alternative is described with an interval [l, u], and one alternative dominates another if and only if intervals do not overlap and
lower bound of the ﬁrst interval is greater than upper bound of the second interval. Preferences with such property may occur in
the cases, when applicants’ scoring system (interview, exam or sum of points) is not exactly accurate.
In the previous paper we have shown the existence of a stable matching and provided the criteria of applicant Pareto-optimality of
a stable matching, based on Stable Improvement Cycles.
However, the Pareto-efﬁcient stable mechanism is not (in general) strategy-proof for applicants. We provide a strategy-proof
applicant-proposing deferred acceptance with tie-breaking, where tie-breaking procedure is organized in a special way. This
special tie-breaking allows to lower chances of an applicant-inefﬁcient stable matching (in comparison to that with random-tie
breaking).
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we consider two-sided matching markets. Examples of such markets include marriage market,
universities-applicants market and others. Pioneering work analysing such kinds of markets is1. They considered
one-to-one and one-to-many markets, where preferences of individuals on one side over individuals on the other side
were considered to be linear orders.
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In this paper we analyse a modiﬁcation of the classical Gale-Shapley admission problem, where preferences of
universities are considered to be interval orders. Interval order allows a speciﬁc form of indifference in the preference
relation. Imagine, each alternative is described with an interval [l, u], and one alternative dominates another if and
only if intervals do not overlap and lower bound of the ﬁrst interval is greater than upper bound of the second interval.
Preferences with such property may occur in the cases, when applicants’ scoring system (interview, exam or sum of
points) is not exactly accurate. In this case if we would construct a weak order directly, according to the scoring
results, some students may be undeservedly concerned less preferred than others, when the small scores difference is
just the matter of chance.
In the previous paper we have shown the existence of a stable matching and, moreover, for every stable matching we
proved the existence of a linear order extension of universities’ preference proﬁle, that does not upset the stability.We
provided a criteria of applicant Pareto-optimality of a stable matching, which is based on Stable Improvement Cycles.
However, the stable mechanism, based on Stable Improvement Cycles, is not strategy-proof. We provide a strategy-
proof applicant-proposing deferred acceptance with tie-breaking, where tie-breaking procedure is organized in a spe-
cial way. This special tie-breaking allows to lower chances of an applicant-inefﬁcient stable matching (in comparison
to that with random-tie breaking). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the classical Gale-
Shapley model is presented and a review of publications is given. In Section 3 we brieﬂy describe our previous results
for the model with interval order preferences. Section 4 contains an efﬁciency-oriented tie-breaking procedure and
corresponding theorem. Section 5 and 6 contain discussion of the linked results and conclusion.
2. The Framework
The following model is considered. LetA be a ﬁnite set of applicants,B - a ﬁnite set of universities. Each applicant
can be admitted to at most one university, while each university b ∈ B cannot admit more applicants than its quota qb.
Deﬁnition 1. The matching is a mapping from A ∪B to the subsets of A ∪B such that:
• each applicant a ∈ A is either admitted to a university μ(a) = b (b ∈ B) or remains unmatched μ(a) = a,
• each university b ∈ B either admits some subset of applicants μ(b) ⊆ A or has no applicants μ(b) = {b},
• if applicant a is admitted to a university (μ(a) = b), than university b admits this applicant (a ∈ μ(b)),
• number of applicants |μ(b)|, admitted to each university b ∈ B, is less than or equal to its quota qb.
This deﬁnition was ﬁrst introduced by Gale and Shapley in1. They also assumed, that both applicants and univer-
sities have preferences over the opposite side. Preferences of applicants are linear orders over universities; applicant
may ﬁnd some universities unacceptable (worse than being unmatched). Similarly, preferences of universities are lin-
ear orders over individual applicants; again, some applicants may be unacceptable. Preferences of the universities over
subsets of applicants are considered to be responsive to the their preferences over individuals with quota restriction.
As both applicants and universities are independent agents and have preferences over each other, the following
question arises: does there exist such a matching, than no agent or group would prefer to avoid it? Gale and Shapley
call this property ’stability’ and introduce the following deﬁnition of a stable matching.
Deﬁnition 2. Matching μ is called stable if it satisﬁes the following properties:
• individual rationality of applicants
no applicant a ∈ A is matched to an unacceptable university;
• individual rationality of universities
no university b ∈ B admits an unacceptable applicant;
• non-wastefullness
no pair (a university b and an applicant a) such that the applicant a prefers this university b to her current
match μ(a) and university b ﬁnds the applicant acceptable and has an empty seat (|μ(b)| < qb);
• pairwise stability
no pair (a university b and an applicant a) that a prefers this university b to her current match μ(a) and b
strictly prefers the applicant a to at least one (say, a′ ∈ μ(b)) of its currently admitted applicants.
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Gale and Shapley proved that in the case of such preferences the set of stable matchings is non empty. Furthermore,
a constructive proof which allows us to ﬁnd a stable matching was proposed - the so called ’Deferred Acceptance (DA)
Procedure’.
Now let us brieﬂy describe the DA algorithm with proposing applicants. In the ﬁrst step, each applicant applies
to her most preferred university. Those universities that got less applications than their quota, ’preliminary admit’
all applicants (this rule applies at any step). If the number of applications exceeds university’s quota, then university
’preliminary admits’ qb most preferred applicants and rejects the others. At the second step each rejected applicant
applies to her second most preferred university. When a university gets second-step application from a candidate,
who is preferred to some of the ﬁrst-step ’preliminary admitted’ applicants, it rejects those ’preliminary admitted’
applicants and admits (also, preliminary) the new one. After that the next similar step begins. This process lasts until
each applicant is either admitted to a university or rejected by all acceptable universities. Last ’preliminary admission’
is a resulting stable matching.
The nice property of the described above DA procedure in the Gale-Shapley model is that it always produces a
matching, which is Pareto-optimal in the set of stable matchings for the proposing side of the market.
Further research was based on Gale and Shapley’s seminal paper. In this paper we are specially interested in the
models, allowing indifferences in the preference proﬁles.
There are many papers that investigate matching problem with indifferences. Problem statement2 is one of the ﬁrst
that follows a real life example: preferences of municipal schools in Boston and NYC school districts being weak
orders. The mechanisms which were originally used in these districts in general produces an unstable matching of
applicants and schools. It was in some sense unfair, especially hurting ’naive’ children and their parents. Abdulka-
diroglu and Sonmez proposed the following new admission procedure: ﬁrst, ties in schools’ preferences are broken
randomly; second, deferred acceptance procedure is applied to the admission problem with linear order preferences.
Proposed mechanism always constructs a stable matching.
However, it is known, that applicant-oriented deferred acceptance mechanism does not always produce a applicant
optimal stable matching (see, for example, one of the ﬁrst paper considering indifferences in preference proﬁle,3).
In4 an algorithm, which provides Pareto-efﬁcient (for applicants) stable matching for the matching problem, where
preferences of the applicants over universities are linear orders and the universities have weak order preferences over
individual applicants, is proposed. This algorithm is based on the so-called Stable Improvement Cycles, a formal
deﬁnition is given below.
In this paper, we introduce one-to-many matching model, in which, as in previous papers, applicants have lin-
ear order preferences over universities, while the universities have the interval order preferences5 over individual
applicants.
Let us give a formal deﬁnition of an interval order5. There are several equivalent deﬁnitions of an interval order,
but we use here one that is most suitable for our purposes.
Deﬁnition 3. Interval order P is a partial order on the set X which satisﬁes the following property: there exists
a function I , which assigns a real line interval I(x) = [l(x), u(x)] for each x ∈ X such that ∀x, y ∈ X xPy iff
l(x) > u(y).
If the set X is ﬁnite, then without loss of generality one can assume that l(x) and u(x) values are integer numbers.
Why do we think that having interval order preferences over applicants may be natural for a university? Often
universities use some kind of scores to evaluate applicants and form a preference relation. But any scoring method
has some error. For example, if some university uses an exam scores with minimum 0 points and maximum 100
points, and gets students’ Ann and Bill applications, with scores, say, 78 and 78.2 respectively, it is not clear, whether
Bill should have priority to Ann or not. If the exam scoring method has 0.5 standard error, than, probably, Bill and
Ann should be considered incomparable in universities preference relation. Moreover, sometimes possible errors are
different for different score values.1
1 For example, in Russian university admission system Uniﬁed State Exam scores are used for ranking purposes. Uniﬁed State exam scores are
obtained in the following non-linear way. If Ann obtained 65 and Bill obtained 70 points, it means that he have solved 3 more tasks in the exam,
but if Paul obtained 25 and Kate obtained 30 points, it means, that Kate have solved just one more task. In the current system these considerations
are not taken into account, and even 1 point excess is enough to be preferred by a university.
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If for some interval order PS there exists a function I , such that for all elements of X intervals have the same size,
such a binary relation is called a semiorder.
In fact, weak orders are a special case of interval orders. For weak orders there exists an interval function I such
that each interval is a single point, that is, u(a) = l(a).
3. Matchings with interval order preferences
We will use the same notation for the sets of agents and the same deﬁnitions of a matching and a stable matching,
as in the previous section. Let us formalise our problem statement. Let P denote the preference proﬁle of agents. For
each a ∈ A Pa is a linear order over setB∪{a}. For each b ∈ B b is an interval order over setA∪{b}. Furthermore,
we assume that each such binary relation satisﬁes ’no indifference with empty set’ property, that is, ∀b ∈ B,∀a ∈ A
either aPbb or bPba2.It means that for each university applicants are clearly divided into two groups: acceptable and
unacceptable ones.
As we consider many-to-one matching problem, we have to deﬁne preferences of the universities over the sets of
applicants. We consider that the preference relation of each university over the sets of applicants is responsive to
the preference relation over individuals: ∀b ∈ B, ∀A′ ⊆ A such that |A′| < qb, a1, a2 ∈ A \ A′ if a1Pba2 then
A′ ∪ {a1} b A′ ∪ {a2}.
3.1. Existence of a stable matching
The deﬁnition of stable matching has already been given in the previous section. Gale and Shapley1 have shown
that in the case of linear order preferences on both sides of the market stable matching always exists.
It is easy to show the existence of a stable matching in case when universities’ preferences are the interval orders.
Theorem 1. If applicants have linear order preferences over universities, and universities have interval order pref-
erences over individual applicants, then stable matching always exists.
This result, in fact, follows from the more general statement: stable matching exists for any partial orders preference
proﬁle.
The next natural question is the following: is it possible to ﬁnd all stable matchings in the discussed model, if
we consider all possible proﬁles of linear extensions P ′ and all matchings, which are stable under these transformed
proﬁles? We ﬁnd out that this is true.
Theorem 2. For each stable matching μ in the model with interval order preferences there exists a transformed
preference proﬁle P ′ consisting of linear extensions of the original preferences P , such that matching μ is also stable
under this linear order preference proﬁle.
Now we have proven that stable matching always exists and, furthermore, for each stable matching μ some linear
order proﬁle always exists which does not contradict original preference proﬁle and stability of μ.
In the classical Gale-Shapley model with linear order preferences matching, obtained via deferred acceptance
procedure with prooposing applicants is the only Pareto-optimal for applicants among all stable matching; the same
is true for universities. In practice applicants are usually an active part of the market while universities (schools, etc.)
are often only public service providers, so their preferences are just deﬁned by law.
The problem matching is obtained via DA applicant-oriented procedure, and it is stable, but inefﬁcient in terms of
applicants’ preferences. In the next section we will prove a theorem that allows us to check, whether some particular
stable matching is applicant-side Pareto-efﬁcient, and, if necessary, transform it into a Pareto-efﬁcient one.
3.2. Stable Improvement Cycle and Pareto-optimality criteria
Ergin and Erdil4 ﬁrst introduced deﬁnition of a Stable Improvement Cycle.
Let C(b, μ) = {a ∈ A|bRaμ(a)}. In addition, let D(b, μ) = {a ∈ C|∀a′ ∈ C aRba′}.
2 Comparison with b means comparison with having an empty seat
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Deﬁnition 4. A Stable Improvement Cycle consists of distinct applicants a1, ..., an ≡ a0 (n ≥ 2) such that
• μ(ai) ∈ B (each applicant in a cycle is assigned to a university),
• ∀ai μ(ai+1)Raiμ(ai)
• ∀ai aiD(μ(ai+1), μ)
Let SIC(ai) = bi+1, SIC(bi) = ai−1
We have proved the following result for the case of interval order preferences.
Theorem 3. Fix P , and let μ be a stable matching. If μ is Pareto-dominated for applicants by another stable matching
nu, then it admits a Stable Improvement Cycle.
This theorem provides the criteria, which allows to check, whether some particular stable matching is applicant-
efﬁcient. Furthermore, we can think about stable and efﬁcient mechanism. First, indifferences in universities’ pref-
erences are broken arbitrary. Second, an applicant proposing DA procedure is applied and some stable matching is
obtained. Third, Stable Improvement Cycle is constructed, if exists, and matching is improved. The last step is re-
peated as many times as necessary. Such a mechanism will always produce a stable matching.
Unfortunately, such mechanism is not strategy-proof. Erdil and Ergin4 show this for the case of weak orders, so it is
also true in our more general setting.
4. Strategy-proof tie-breaking and efﬁcient outcome
In this section we introduce a speciﬁc form of tie-breaking, which allows us to reduce chances of an inefﬁcient
outcome. Consider the following: preference relation of each applicant (university) is independently randomly chosen
from the set of all possible linear (interval) orders. Our question is how to break ties in particular university’s in order
to reduce chance of inefﬁcient outcome without taking into account preferences of other universities and applicants?
When we deal with weak orders, this question has no answer, but with interval orders this is not the same. In the
interval orders some ties are different from the others in terms of possible efﬁciency losses.
In the previous section it was shown that any inefﬁcient stable matching admits Stable Improvement Cycle.
4.1. Example
Let A = {a1, a2, a3} be a set of applicants and let a1Pba3, a1Iba2, a2Iba3, while qb = 1.
We are mostly interested in a situation where under deferred acceptance procedure university b receives proposals
from each of the three applicants. Now consider three possible linear extensions of this interval order:
• a1P ′ba2P ′ba3. In this case a1 will be admitted to the university b. Two other applicants will be rejected and,
therefore, admitted to some less preferred university. Both a2 and a3 will create edges pointing to university b
in the Improvement Graph.
• a1P ′ba3P ′ba2. Again, a1 will be admitted to the university b and both a2 and a3 will create to edges in Improve-
ment Graph.
• a2P ′ba1P ′ba1. In this case, on the contrary, a2 will be admitted to the university b and only a1 will create edge
in Improvement Graph (as a1 is strictly better then a3 according to original preferences, a3 will not be able to
point to b in the Improvement Graph).
In the latter case we obtain only one edge, while in the former cases we obtain two edges. So in the latter case chances
of obtaining Stable Improvement Cycle are lower (all other things being equal).
The following procedure is based on a simple idea, illustrated by the above example
• Step 1. Consider original preference relation Pb and ’best’ (undominated) antichain A1={a1, ..., ak}. Let
aiP
′
baj if aiP ⊂ ajP , that is, ai dominates aj in the new transformed preference relation −b if ai dominates
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strictly smaller set of alternatives than aj . All remaining ties among elements in the antichain are broken
randomly.
• Step t ∈ [2, T ]. Consider the ’best’ antichain At on A \ (∪At−1). Repeate the step 1 for the At. Repeat steps
until no elements are remaining in A \ (cupAt).
• Step T + 1. For any elements a ∈ An, a′ ∈ Am aP ′ba′ iff n < m.
Let us ﬁx some university b, and consider preferences of all other agents as random variables. Namely, Pa,
preference relation for applicant a – is a descrete random variable, uniformly distributed on the set of all linear
orders on B ∪ {a}. Pb′ is a discrete random variable, uniformly distributed on A ∪ {′b}. All random variables are
independent.
We can now state the following general result.
Theorem 4. Let all preference relations of the universities be an interval orders of special form, where every max-
imal antichain has the same cardinality. If ties are broken according to the procedure, described above, then under
applicant-proposing deferred acceptance procedure with proposing applicants we have the lowest (among all pos-
sible tie-breaking procedures, that consider preferences of universities independently) chances of constructing an
applicant-inefﬁcient stable matching.
In fact this theorem allows us to construct a new version of deferred acceptance mechanism with tie-breaking.
First, break ties according to the procedure described above. Second, apply deferred acceptance procedure with
applicants proposing. Such procedure is strategy-proof for applicants (as ﬁrst step tie-breaking does not consider
there preferences, while the second step is just classical Gale-Shapley procedure). At the same time, probability of
obtaining an inefﬁcient stable matching with such procedure is lower then with random tie-breaking procedure.
5. Discussion
Interval orders are, in fact, a special case of the partial orders. So the results, obtained for matching with pref-
erences, being partial orders, are directly applicable to our problem statement. Although there are plenty of papers,
analysing problem setting with partial orders preferences, none of them solves the same task as ours. Some of the
papers (see, for example,6) consider more restrictive deﬁnitions of stability: super-stability or strict stability. In our
setting this two concepts are, in fact, the same. Super-stability, as the original Gale-Shapley stability, requires no
blocking pair property, but uses a different deﬁnition of a blocking pair. An and a university are said to be a blocking
pair if the applicant weakly prefers the university to her current match, and university weakly prefers applicant to any
of its current students. It is obvious that super-stable matching may not exist. If the set of super-stable matchings is
non-empty, it forms a distributive lattice, so there exists a unique applicant-optimal matching.
Novel paper7 assumes the ﬁrm-worker model where ﬁrms does not have sufﬁcient information to rank potential
employees and at the beginning has partial order preferences. Additional information may be obtained via interviews.
Authors construct a mechanism, which allows to ﬁnd ﬁrms-efﬁcient (or employee-efﬁcient) stable matching and
minimize number of interviews. The main difference with our setting is that ﬁrms are assumed to have unknown to
themselves strict preferences over employees, while in our setting universities are assumed to be truly indifferent.
Paper8 is one of the closest to our setting. Authors use the same deﬁnition of stability and construct a mechanism,
which ﬁnds a men-efﬁcient stable matching. Their result has two main differences with ours. First, their mechanism
may not ﬁnd an efﬁcient stable matching, even it is clear, that efﬁcient stable matchings always exist. Second, they do
not provide criteria of one-side efﬁciency of some particular matching.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we analyse an extension of the classical university-applicant Gale-Shapley model, where we allow
preferences of the universities be interval orders. This extension covers admission systems, where scoring is used for
ranking applicants, but scoring method may have some error. We found out that stable matching always exists and
can be found via deferred acceptance procedure. Unfortunately, applicant-proposing deferred acceptance procedure
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may produce an applicant-inefﬁcient stable matching. Our ﬁrst result is a criteria, which allows to determine, whether
some particular stable matching is applicant-efﬁcient and improve a matching, if necessary. Our results has direct
practical implications in centralized admission mechanisms.
Unfortunately, the mechanism, based on application of this criteria, is not strategy-proof. So, we propose another
mechanism, which is strategy-proof and have reduced chances of obtaining inefﬁcient stable matching under DA with
applicants proposing.
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